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Introduction: 
 
In a general sense, Geography deals with a number of thematically differently defined 
phenomena on the surface of the earth (as just a glance at any map show). These 
phenomena which come into contact with, overlap and restrict one another. Their 
chronological, hierarchic and spatial co-existence are affected by man and nature, who 
interact and initiate processes which in turn alter their different environments. Seen 
from this point of view, the task of the geographer may be defined as drawing attention 
to the complexity of this reality and explaining how mankind, in the course of his 
cultural evolution, has been able to assert himself by adaptation and formation of 
structures. 
 
 
1) On the idiographic and nomothetic approaches: 
 
Geography has become engaged in this task step by step. In its earliest stage it studied 
countries and described regional units, i.e. it was dedicated to understanding the 
Individual and therefore tended, idiographically, to individualise (WINDELBAND 
1894, pp. 10 and RICKERT 1902, pp. 226). The aim of an idiographic science is to 
study what is special in its historically determined nature. General geography was 
aimed at categorising and explaining forms observed in nature and landscapes shaped 
by the influence of human culture. Its intention was to ascertain certain basic laws and 
was therefore nomothetic, or generalising, in its alignment.   )2
 
At that time, general geography regarded itself as closely related to the natural sciences. 
Causal methods of examination were applied (von RICHTHOFEN 1903), not only in 
physical and mathematical Geography, but also in anthropogeography. The principle of 
causality states that every cause has an effect (or several effects) and every effect a 
cause (or several causes). According to this method, geography is founded on the 
observation of materially defined forms. The form represents the effect in the chain of 
cause and effect. By proceeding inductively, it is possible to deduce the cause from it 
and transpose the result to other corresponding forms. 
 
Geography has retained its methodical position between the idiographic and nomothetic 
approaches up to the present, even if the classification of the fields of study has altered 
to some extent in the course of development. Over the years, "regional geography" as 
an idiographically oriented field of research has become less important. In case of 
general geography, the nomothetic approach is still dominant in physical geography, 
whereas anthropogeography, which is the subject of this paper, has been less uniform in 
its development since about 1920.  )3
 
The idiographic approach finds its principal application in historical geography. It 
makes most use of the hermeneutic method. It is mainly due to the work of DILTHEY 
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(1910/70, e.g. pp. 98, 255) that hermeneutics have become the principal method of 
investigation in the humane sciences. It determines, among other things, the way in 
which texts are handled. In history and historical geography, the evaluation of historical 
sources and archaeological findings is most important. Only what is corroborated 
directly by sources is known to be true. The rest has to be carefully deduced in order to 
obtain an overall result which is as free as possible from contradictions. The 
investigation can only proceed step by step with reference to the overall and often 
complex argumentation network. The finer the mesh of the network and the more 
sources (which may be spatially, materially and chronologically remoter) are brought 
in, the more certain the result. The most accurate interpretation is the one which allows 
all the facts known about the object of study to be fitted logically and consistently into 
the context. This method requires previous knowledge and sensitivity because the 
investigators use many of their own ideas in coming to their conclusions. Their 
judgement is also affected indirectly by their own development and surroundings (see 
below). 
 
The nomothetic approach should form a definitive basis for future studies, although the 
kind of explanation has changed in the course of time. In the following decades, 
natural-scientific approaches dominated. In the 1920s and 1930s, deterministic laws 
were applied (e.g. Newton's Law of Gravity in the description of migration fields) or 
developed anew (Theory of Central Places; CHRISTALLER 1933). In this way it was 
possible to define and explain patterns of economic and social dissemination adequately 
from the point of view of the time. 
 
The general demands made by POPPER (1934/89, pp. 7) from a higher theoretical 
standpoint, were as follows: 
1. that the theory should be examined by logical comparison of the conclusions with 
one another to determine whether it is intrinsically free of contradiction; 
2. that the logical form of the theory should be examined to determine whether it has 
the character of an empirically scientific theory, i.e. that it is not, for example, 
tautological; 
3. that it should be determined whether the theory under scrutiny (compared to other 
theories) can be regarded as a scientific improvement; 
4. that the theory be tested by the "empirical application" of the conclusions derived 
(verifiability); 
5. that the theory should be formulated in such a way that the conclusion may be proven 
wrong by experience ("falsifiability", p. 15). 
 
Probabilistic and statistical methods then became popular (e.g. GARRISON 1959/60; 
HÄGERSTRAND 1953/67) as a result of the "quantitative revolution" and the 
expansion of the statistical basis in the 1950s and 1960s. This meant abandoning the 
deterministic basis for forming models. The conditions formulated by Popper from a 
positivistic viewpoint became less and less capable of fulfilment in the social 
environment of anthropogeography. The fundamental perspective was also shifting 
(BARTELS 1968; HARD 1973): Human society itself and human behaviour were 
becoming the subject of research and analysis. Thus anthropogeography became 
increasingly separated from physical geography and research in these fields demanded 
different approaches. 
 
Initially, the main focus was concentrated on the social group which consists of 
individuals behaving and adjusting in certain ways. This prepared the ground for 
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applied social geography (and economic geography), even if this only found practical 
fulfilment in the 1970s after the Geographers' Conference (“Geographentag”) in Kiel.  )4
 
On closer scrutiny it becomes apparent that this concept was inspired by the system 
model. Entities were studied which consist of elements. Both refer to one another, and 
represent partners of equal importance. In the field of biology, things went even further. 
It was discovered (BERTALANFFY 1950) that systems and their elements are situated 
in a flow of information and energy ("flow equilibrium systems") i.e. are open towards 
their environment. They regulate themselves by means of feedback (WIENER 1948/68, 
pp. 124). The path to abstraction and formation of mathematical models was now 
marked out. Ecologically oriented biogeography, and after some hesitation, the 
(inorganically oriented) physical geography partially adopted the concept, similarly in 
anthropogeography, economic geography, whereas in social geography, the changes 
were only accepted at the fringe. 
 
The "quantitative revolution" on the other hand, was soon over. At the level of the 
elements it was less than adequate. In social geographic studies with nomothetic aims, 
the free application and combination of facts mostly inductively obtained, mostly 
developed into generalised statements. If we do not wish to confine this approach 
strictly to the original idiographic aims, we may describe the methods as hermeneutic or 
phenomenological. In the last resort, all the activities by which mankind familiarises 
himself with the characteristics of his environment are based on a general process of 
perception, which is, on the one hand, as wide as possible to take in all available 
information (hermeneutics) and on the other hand as deeply as possible to clarify the 
notions and meanings involved (phenomenology).  
 
 
2) Constructivism and method of discourse in social geography: 
 
This methodical procedure found its continuation in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly 
because in social geography it came to be accepted that man was the "agens" and that 
society was shaped, so to speak, “from the bottom up”. The focus of interest 
(particularly WERLEN 1995-97) was directed at action-based social geography. A new 
dimension had been opened up, although no real advantage could be gained from it, 
because there was no structural categorisation of actions which meant that the context 
remained unclear. The aim of nomothetics, i.e. of giving a generally accepted firm base, 
became vague and inexact. Moreover, the discussion was overshadowed by the 
statements of so-called constructivism which questioned the possibilities of human 
perception (see e.g. Wardenga, Gebhardt and Pohl, in: MÜLLER-MAHN and 
WARDENGA, publ., 2005). 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, MATURANA and VARELA (1984/87) developed their theory 
of autopoietic systems and illustrated it using the example of living organisms. Unlike 
the flow-equilibrium systems, the autopoietic systems regulate not only their behaviour 
themselves, but also create themselves materially and spatially. Of particular interest 
for our train of thought is the spatial inside-outside relationship which is linked with 
this theory. In contrast to the open flow-equilibrium systems, the authors regarded the 
autopoietic systems as "structurally determined" systems, which, as such, did not permit 
"instructive" interactions. "Everything taking place in them, takes place as a structural 
change which has its base at all times in their structure, whether through their own inner 
dynamic force or triggered (but not specified) by the circumstances of their 
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interactions" (MATURANA 1998, p. 322). This statement implies substantial 
epistemological consequences. It goes on to say "Nothing lying outside a living system 
can, within the system, determine what happens inside it, and since the observer is a 
living system, nothing lying outside the observer can determine within him or her, what 
happens within him or her. This means that the observer, as a living system, cannot 
constitutively make any assertions or statements which reveal or connote anything 
independently of the operations by which he or she generates his or her statements and 
assertions". 
 
This position of "radical constructivism" stands or falls with the assumption of a closed 
cognitive circuit in the system of the organism (MATURANA and VARELA 1984/87, 
p. 260). To date however, this has neither been proven nor verified. On the contrary, the 
autopoietic system also seems to be an open system, i.e. that information (as in the 
flow- and non-equilibrium system, or the hierarchic system) can penetrate it from 
outside and have a decisive effect on how it organises itself materially and spatially.   )6
 
This would make it clear that we see reality as such as existing independently of us and 
that we can therefore explore it. However, we must realise that, because of the filter of 
our own habits and intentions, this cannot take place by direct access as maintained by 
POPPER (1987, p. 29) but only with a number of individually differing concessions. In 
other respects too, there are increasing doubts as to whether constructivism in its radical 
form represents a methodically relevant basis. There are now a number of different 
variants (a list of quotations and a bibliography can be found in BEATS BIBLIONETZ 
2005).  
 
It appears to me that the present methodical discussion in social geography reflects this 
situation to a certain extent. There is a wide variety of hypotheses, ideas and opinions. 
These may have been developed using the hermeneutic or phenomenological method, 
or based on well-known theories in other fields (e.g. Giddens' "Structuration Theory" or 
Luhmann's "System Theory" (GIDDENS 1984/88 and LUHMANN 1984: "import of 
theories"; SCHMIDT 2004) or put forward spontaneously. With regard to method, the 
impression is of a post-modern "anything goes" situation (FEYERABEND 1975/86, p. 
21). 
 
In order to subject them to a critical examination, theoretically defined discourses 
evolved; the individual theses are exchanged among participants in discussion groups 
or dialogues. This means that communication i.e. language is of considerable 
importance. Here, language should not be seen purely from a technical point of view as 
a means of transmitting information, as demanded by WITTGENSTEIN in his 
"Tractatus" (1922-1953/1990). It should be remembered that it is moulded by the 
speakers as individuals in their own way. In his later "Philosophische Untersuchungen", 
Wittgenstein developed a doctrine of “language games” (“Sprachspiele”) in which each 
"game" forms a functional unit and as such reflects a form of life, i.e. every train of 
thought, every idea is bound up with the mentality of the person speaking (see also 
GADAMER II, p. 428). 
 
This hinders understanding in the communicating community. In order to achieve a 
reasonable consensus for everyone concerned, certain rules have to be observed 
(HABERMAS 1981, especially I, pp. 25).  
- Everyone taking part must have the same rights – a requirement, which, as experience 
shows, is seldom fulfilled. In most cases (particularly in smaller groups) an internal 
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hierarchy develops in which certain persons dominate and the discussion can quickly 
become a contest for power or prestige.  APEL (1992, pp. 44) therefore appeals for a 
climate of discussion which is free of dominance and pressure, but admits that it would 
probably be impossible to realise. 
- Everyone should agree that the best arguments are given preference. Here too there 
are reservations because understanding something else or other people requires a 
willingness to exercise self-criticism. One must be able to listen and accept the 
possibility that one's own perception of the truth may be placed in doubt (GADAMER 
1960/90, II, p. 116). This delays the adoption of innovative ideas. 
- Another rule demands that the participants behave cooperatively and are committed to 
forming a consensus, e.g. in order to avoid conflicts of interest brought in from outside. 
This too is difficult. FOUCAULT (1973/81, p. 42) rightly asks "how is it that a certain 
statement appeared, and no other instead of it?" He was unable to answer it. "If every 
discourse has an outside, if its validities are subject to conditions which may change but 
cannot, in the last resort, be made understood and put into practice, there can never be 
an ‘overriding discourse’ which would settle a conflict between discourses" 
(WALDENFELS 1990, p. 201). 
 
At the end of a discourse there may be a result which is accepted by a majority. It may 
be a truth (according to Pierce, quoted from APEL 1990, p. 115) in the sense 
understood by the self-regulating process of research, i.e. it may legitimise proceeding 
with further work. Discourse is without doubt able to create a climate for producing 
good ideas – something which should not be despised, as many pioneering impulses in 
the field of social geography show (summarised e.g. by PEET 1998; HUBBARD, 
KITCHIN, BARTLEY und FULLER 2002). To this extent, discourse is of considerable 
heuristic value. 
 
But how sound is such a "truth" over the long term? Does it provide a firm base for 
scientific research? This is by no means certain. An answer to this question is urgently 
needed since the demands on precision of scientific statement have increased 
substantially over the past decades. Researchers should come as close as possible to 
results which are objectively sustainable. That means that the focus is once again on 
scientific accuracy. 
 
 
3) The Theories of Process and Complexity: 
 
The discourse method finds perhaps its natural-scientific counterpart in the Chaos 
Theory and Synergetics (HAKEN 1977/83) which have emerged partially from the 
System Theory since the 1970s in the fields of physics, chemistry and biology. They 
describe the behaviour of non-linear systems, each of whose parts (elements) obey 
deterministic laws, whereas the behaviour of the entireties is unpredictable. A 
"deterministic chaos" is created in which the elements join to form patterns. 
 
The development of research continued and increasingly accurate methods were used. 
The Chaos Theory forms the basis for the Complexity Theory, which attempts to 
explain how parts of different kinds act, react and interact with one another with the 
aim of understanding complex phenomena such as language, life and society. The 
collective behaviour differs from the behaviour of the individual parts. This finds 
expression in so-called self-organisation. As with the System Theory and the Chaos 
Theory, the Theory of Complexity is one of the great basic interdisciplinary theories. A 
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number of institutes in the USA (such as the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico and the 
New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge, Mass.) as well as several 
university departments are dedicated to research in this field. Attempts to come to terms 
with problem of complexity (especially in physics, chemistry, biology and, in their 
train, sociology) have produced a number of hypotheses and ideas (e.g. BAR-YAM 
2003) but they have still been unable to do justice to the fundamental problem: They 
have still not succeeded in describing ubiquitous complex structures (characterised by 
processes, hierarchies and spatial differentiation definable by self-organisation and 
emergence) in a single theory and explaining their effect convincingly. These 
disciplines seem to have reached the limits set by their medium and methods of study. 
     
This is where the Process Theory starts. It joins the anarchic "from the bottom up" with 
the generalising "from the top down". The argumentation used here is therefore based 
on the natural-scientific approach. It aims to produce solutions which give rise to laws. 
 
Let us pause for a moment here. Initially (since approximately 1880) geography 
organised perceptible phenomena (forms) on the surface of the earth mainly according 
to material criteria and explained them causally (with a nomothetic aim) or with the 
assistance of hermeneutic method (with an idiographic aim). Increasing knowledge of 
the complex structure of reality and the refinement of (e.g. phenomenological) methods 
yielded (from around 1920) an insight into the structure and the functional 
interrelationships. In this way, the foundation was laid for understanding the system-
based links in the flows of energy beneath the level of material phenomena (from 
approx. 1960). Studies which were idiographic in aim as well as nomothetic, 
contributed to this. 
 
At the present stage of development (since about 1980/90) as we see it, this system-
structured network of flows of information and energy is also defined by its hierarchic 
order, its spatial extent and its differentiated dynamic transformation down to the level 
of actions ("Process Theory"). The spatially limited non-equilibrium systems and the 
chronologically limited processes of conversion connected therewith, are prominent as 
the actual centres of activity. We are dealing with spatially and chronologically intricate 
formations with individual profiles, but which obey generally valid laws both internally 
and in the group. They are of a different type than the traditional regional geographies 
(“Länderkunden”). 
 
More than any other discipline, geography is able to make a significant contribution in 
this area. The reason for this: 
1) The reasonable "dimension" studied by geography, is the mesocosmos (VOLLMER 
1985-86, I, p.57), i.e. the world we experience daily. Mankind as a society is the 
preferred medium of study, and the researcher can, as a participant, observe and 
evaluate its phenomena.  
2) He is also assisted by the thematic division of society and its manifestation in 
institutions, because it illustrates the qualitative association and location of processes 
and systems. In this way, insights can be gained into the complicated structure of 
processes.  
3) The deeper research penetrates into the object being studied, i.e. the greater the 
degree of abstraction, the more it becomes concerned with the general (rather than the 
specific) and the closer disciplines come to one another. Not only disciplines dealing 
with subjects similar to geography (such as history and social sciences) have to deal 
with complexity, non-equilibrium systems, conversion processes, self-organisation, 
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emergence etc., but also the natural sciences (e.g. biology and theoretical physics; 
FLIEDNER 2007). 
 
Methodologically speaking, geography can act as a bridge between the natural and the 
social sciences. In this case, the wide variety of objects characteristic of the study of 
geography may be regarded as an advantage. 
 
On the other hand, the interdisciplinary concern with the subject of complexity may 
provide geography (which, as a science, defines itself spatially) with important 
impulses. Because space, according to one result of theoretical study , is formed by 
self-organisation and emergence. It would appear that geography has new interesting 
tasks ahead of it. 
)7
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1) Several Passages in the text correspond to the Preface in German to the book  (FLIEDNER 2006, p. 5-10). 
2) Explained in more detail in FLIEDNER 1993, p. 25-53 f. 
3) Dito, p. 63-94 f. 
4) Dito, p. 112-159 f. 
5) Explained in more detail in FLIEDNER 2005, p. 69f.,119f.,202f. 
6) Dito, p. 245 f.   
7) Dito, p. 119 f.,287 f. 
 
